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ABSTRACT
Automatic speaker verification systems are increasingly used
as the primary means to authenticate costumers. Recently, it
has been proposed to train speaker verification systems us-
ing end-to-end deep neural models. In this paper, we show
that such systems are vulnerable to adversarial example at-
tacks. Adversarial examples are generated by adding a pe-
culiar noise to original speaker examples, in such a way that
they are almost indistinguishable, by a human listener. Yet,
the generated waveforms, which sound as speaker A can be
used to fool such a system by claiming as if the waveforms
were uttered by speaker B. We present white-box attacks on a
deep end-to-end network that was either trained on YOHO or
NTIMIT. We also present two black-box attacks. In the first
one, we generate adversarial examples with a system trained
on NTIMIT and perform the attack on a system that trained on
YOHO. In the second one, we generate the adversarial exam-
ples with a system trained using Mel-spectrum features and
perform the attack on a system trained using MFCCs. Our re-
sults show that one can significantly decrease the accuracy of
a target system even when the adversarial examples are gener-
ated with different system potentially using different features.
Index Terms— Automatic speaker verification, adversar-
ial examples
1. INTRODUCTION
Automatic speaker verification is the task of verifying that a
spoken utterance has been produced by a claimed speaker. It
is one of the most mature technologies for biometric authen-
tication deployed by banks and e-commerce as the primary
means to authenticate customers online and over the phone.
The vulnerability of such a system is a real threat to these
applications.
The standard verification protocol comprises the follow-
ing three steps: training, enrollment, and evaluation. In the
training stage, one learns a suitable internal speaker represen-
tation from a set of utterances and builds a simple scoring
function. In the enrollment stage, a speaker provides a few
utterances which are used to estimate the speaker model. Dur-
ing the evaluation stage, the verification task is performed by
scoring a new unknown utterance against the speaker model.
If the resulted score is greater than a pre-defined threshold,
the system predicts that the unknown utterance produced by
the claimed speaker. When the authentication is based on the
voice of the speaker, irrespective of what the speaker said, the
system is a text-independent speaker verification system.
Most of the modern speaker verification systems have sev-
eral components. For example, the combination of i-vector
for speaker representation and probabilistic linear discrim-
inant analysis (PLDA) for a scoring function has become
the dominant approach, both for text-dependent and text-
independent speaker verification [1, 2, 3]. Recently, Heigold
et al. [4] proposed to train speaker verification systems in an
end-to-end fashion using deep neural models. This approach
allows to directly learn from utterances, which improves cap-
turing long-range context and reduces the complexity (one
vs. number of frames evaluations per utterance), and the
direct and joint estimation, which can lead to better and more
compact models. Moreover, this approach often results in
considerably simplified systems requiring fewer concepts and
heuristics.
Although deep neural networks have enabled several
breakthroughs in notoriously difficult problems such as im-
age classification [5, 6], speech recognition [7, 8], speech
processing [9, 10] and machine translation [11], it has been
shown [12] that they are not robust to tiny perturbations in the
input space. Indeed, adding a well-chosen small perturbation
to the input of a network can change its prediction. When
the difference between the perturbed image and the original
image is indistinguishable by the human eye the example, the
perturbed image is called an adversarial example.
Adversarial examples were first introduced in [13]. Their
study first demonstrated that deep neural networks could
achieve high accuracy on previously unseen examples while
being vulnerable to small adversarial perturbations. This
finding has recently aroused keen interest in the commu-
nity [12, 14, 13, 15]. Several studies have subsequently
analyzed the phenomenon [16, 17] and various approaches
have been proposed to improve the robustness of neural net-
works [18, 19]. However, most of the previous works on
adversarial examples are focused on the vision domain.
In this work, we investigate the generation of adversarial
examples to attack an end-to-end neural based speaker verifi-
cation model. We demonstrate the generation of adversarial
examples to attack a text-dependent speaker verification sys-
tem while using the architecture proposed in [4].
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To the best of our knowledge, the only work that applied
adversarial attacks to speech data is [20] where the authors
present an adversarial attack on an end-to-end automatic
speech recognition system. We are unaware of any previous
study on adversarial examples for fool speaker verification
systems. A different approach for attacking speaker verifi-
cation systems is known as spoofing attack [21, 22]. In that
type of attack, an adversary may use a falsifying voice, such
as the recorded file of another person, as input for the speaker
verification system. Our approach is different since our goal
is to generate acoustic utterances which sound as speaker A
(at least to the human ear) but can be used to fool the system
by claiming that utterances were produced by speaker B.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we
formally set the notation and definitions used throughout
the paper. Section 3 provides a detailed description of the
speaker verification model. In Section 4 we describe the
mechanism behind the generation of adversarial examples.
In Section 5 we report the results of attacking the speaker
verification model in various ways. We conclude the paper
with a discussion in Section 6.
2. NOTATIONS AND DEFINITIONS
In this section, we formulate the task of speaker verification
rigorously and set the notation for the rest of the paper. We
denote the domain of the acoustic feature vectors by X ⊂
Rd. The acoustic feature representation of a speech signal is
therefore a sequence of vectors x = (x1, x2, ...xT ), where
xi ∈ X for all 1 ≤ i ≤ T . The length of the input signal
varies from one signal to another. Thus T is not fixed. We
denote by X ∗ the set of all finite-length sequences over X .
Recall that in speaker verification the goal is to assert if
the claimed speaker spoke the input utterance. Specifically,
the speaker verification system is a function that gets as input
an utterance x produced by an unknown speaker, and a set
of n enrollment utterances produced by speaker k denoted as
Xk = {xk1 , ...,xkn}. The output of the system is a real number
in the simplex p ∈ [0, 1] estimating the probability that the
utterance x produced by speaker k.
Let gθ : X ∗ × (X ∗)n → [0, 1] be the speaker verifica-
tion function implemented as neural network with a set of
parameters θ. Given a set of training examples, the param-
eters θ are found by minimizing the negative log likelihood
loss function. Each example in the training set is a tuple
(x,Xk, y) of a spoken utterance x ∈ X , an enrollment set
of a speaker k, Xk, and a binary label y ∈ {0, 1} indicating
whether the utterance x was produced speaker k. We denote
by ` : [0, 1]× {0, 1} → R the log-likehood loss function.
3. END-TO-END DEEP NETWORKMODEL
In this section, we describe the network architecture used as
our speaker verification function. The architecture was ini-
Fig. 1: End-to-end deep network model for speaker verifica-
tion. The architecture is based on [4].
tially proposed in [4], and serves as a baseline in recent work
on end-to-end models for speaker verification [23, 24]. It is
depicted in Figure 1.
Recall that the input to the verification function is an un-
known utterance and a set of n enrollment utterances. Each of
the n+1 utterances is fed into a recurrent LSTM network and
is represented as an embedding vector of sizeD. Denote by u
and by Uk = (uk1 , . . . ,u
k
n) the embeddings of the unknown
utterance x and the enrollment set Xk. The embeddings of
the enrollments set are averaged to a single vector:
vk =
1
n
n∑
i
uki .
Then the resemblance between the embedding of the un-
known utterance and the average embedding of the enroll-
ment is computed using the cosine-similarity function:
sim(u,vk) =
u · vk
‖u‖‖vk‖ .
The final stage takes the cosine-similarity, multiplies it by a
scalar and add a bias to generate a probability estimation. One
can think of this layer as an automatic setting of the threshold
detection. The whole network is trained using with negative
log-likelihood loss function.
4. GENERATING ADVERSARIAL EXAMPLES
Given an input utterance x, an adversarial example is a per-
turbed version of the original pattern
x˜ = x+ δx,
where δx ∈ Rd is small enough for x˜ to be undistinguish-
able from x by a human, but causes the network to predict an
incorrect label.
Formally, given a trained network gθ and a p-norm, the
adversarial example is generated by solving the following op-
timization problem:
x˜ = argmax
x˜:‖x˜−x‖p≤
`
(
gθ(x˜,X
k), y
)
,
where  represents the strength of the adversary, and p is the
norm value. In words, we would like to maximize, rather than
minimize, the loss function between the prediction of gθ on
the adversarial example and the correct label under the con-
straint that the adversarial example is similar to the original
example in p-norm.
Assuming the loss function ` is differentiable, the authors
of [16] proposed to take the first order Taylor expansion of
x 7→ `(gθ(x,Xk), y) to compute δx by solving the following
problem:
x˜ = argmax
x˜:‖x˜−x‖p≤
(∇x`(gθ(x,Xk), y))T (x˜− x)
When p =∞ the solution to the optimization problem is
x˜ = x+  sign(∇x`(gθ(x,Xk), y)),
which corresponds to the fast gradient sign method proposed
in [12]. In other words, generating adversarial examples fol-
lowing the fast sign gradient method involves with taking the
sign of the gradients of the loss function with respect to the
input, multiply it by a small fraction so it will be indistin-
guishable to a human and add it to the original example.
Note that a single training example is composed of two
parts; an enrollment set and a test utterance. To mimic a re-
alistic model attack, we add the adversarial noise only to the
test utterance and leave the enrollment set unchanged.
5. EXPERIMENTS
The setting was similar in all our experiments. We repre-
sented the speech utterances by acoustic features and trained
a speaker verification model on that representation. Then we
generated adversarial examples by adding noise to the feature
vectors, and finally, acoustic waveforms were reconstructed
from the adversarial example. For a reference, we also recon-
struct waveforms of the original examples. The waveforms
corresponding to the adversarial examples were used to fool
the trained model as well as a different model that was trained
under different conditions. We now describe the experimental
setting in detail.
We evaluated the effectiveness of our method on two
datasets: YOHO [25] and NTIMIT [26], each sampled at
8kHz. We used two sets of acoustic features. The first set
of features was the Mel-spectrum. The acoustic signal was
split into frames of 64 milliseconds with a shift of 4 millisec-
onds1. Then we applied Hamming window and computed
1The high shift frequency allows us a better reconstruction of the signal.
STFT. We used a 65 Mel frequency channels that yielded
d = 65 acoustic features. The second set we used was the
Mel-Frequency Cepstrum Coefficients (MFCCs), extracted
from the Mel-spectrum. Overall we trained four models; for
each of the datasets (NTIMIT and YOHO), we used both
feature sets.
For the YOHO corpus, each training example was gen-
erated by picking one of the verification utterances and as-
sociating it with a set of 10 random enrollment utterances.
Ten speakers were excluded from the training set and used
as a test set. For the NTIMIT corpus, since there are only
ten utterances per speaker, we generate each of the training
examples by picking one utterance to be the verification ex-
ample and four other utterances to be an enrollment set. In
both datasets, we swapped the enrollment set in half of the
examples to generate negative instances.
We generated adversarial examples using the fast gradient
sign method by adding adversarial perturbation to the test ut-
terance vector x using several epsilon values. We found that
 ∈ (0.2, 0.3) caused the classifier to misclassify the adver-
sarial examples with a high probability while keeping them
remarkably similar to the original ones, a description of the
adversarial examples evaluation process can be found in the
next subsection. The models‘ performance was evaluated us-
ing the precision of correct classifications, and not using the
standard equal error-rate (EER) since we aimed to show the
effectiveness of adversarial attacks rather than comparing our
model to other speaker verification systems.
5.1. ABX Testing
To validate that the generated adversarial examples are indeed
indistinguishable by humans we performed an ABX test. An
ABX test is a standard way to assess the detectable differ-
ences between two choices of sensory stimuli. We presented
to listeners two audio samples A and B; each being either
the original (reconstructed) waveform or an adversarial wave-
form of the same example. These two samples are followed
by a third sound X which was randomly chosen to be either
A or B. The listener was instructed to decide whether X is
more similar to sample A or sample B. We randomly sam-
pled 50 pairs of audio examples, original and adversarial ones.
All waveforms were reconstructed from Mel-spectrogram us-
ing the Griffin-Lim algorithm [27]. eight different listeners
tested each audio pair. Overall, on average 54% of the exam-
ples were correctly classified by the human listeners. Subse-
quently, we use such indistinguishable adversarial examples
to test the robustness of speaker verification system.
5.2. A white-box attack
In the setting of a white-box attack, we assume that the adver-
sary has access to the internals of the model to be attacked. In
other words, the attacker has complete knowledge and con-
trol of the network and can access the networks‘ gradients.
Table 1: System accuracy under white-box attacks.
YOHO
Original test Adversarial test Diff
Mel-spectrum 85.50% 37.50% 48.00%
MFCC 87.50% 25.75% 61.75%
NTIMIT
Original test Adversarial test Diff
Mel-spectrum 84.26% 24.40% 59.86%
MFCC 82.14% 10.20% 69.94%
Table 2: False-positive rate (FPR) under white-box attacks.
YOHO
Original test Adversarial test
Mel-Spectrum 1.46% 69.76%
MFCC 4.88% 94.63%
NTIMIT
Original test Adversarial test
Mel-Spectrum 10.98% 79.19%
MFCC 1.73% 82.08%
An adversary can use these gradients to perturb the original
input to become adversarial. The adversarial examples were
crafted directly on the inputs that fed to the network.
Table 1 summarizes the results. The upper panel and
the lower panel describes the results for the YOHO and the
NTIMIT corpus, respectively. For each dataset, the accuracy
on the test set is given in the first column. Even though one
could achieve better results, our focus is to demonstrate the
effectiveness of adversarial attacks on this model and to pro-
pose alternative ways (in addition to the traditional ones) of
evaluating speaker verification systems. We assume the per-
formance difference observed here is due to limited training
data (YOHO has around 15.6 hours of speech, while the ”OK
Google” dataset contains 333 hours off speech [4]). In the
second column, we presented the accuracy of the adversarial
examples (generated from the test set examples). The last
column is the degradation in performance.
In speech verification systems it might be considered
more important to perform well regarding false-positive rate
(FPR), this is the case where an adversary claims to be some-
one else and is wrongfully accepted. Results of FPR are
given in Table 2, where we can see a significant degradation
regarding FPR performance during the adversarial attack.
5.3. Cross-dataset
In the setting of black-box attack, the adversary has no ac-
cess the model internals, only to its inputs and outputs. This
setup is the strongest since it assumes no knowledge of the
adversary regarding the type of model, its architecture or pa-
rameters. Moreover, the success of a black-box attack almost
assures that a white-box will succeed equally or better. In our
work, we performed two back-box attacks: a cross-dataset
attack and a cross-feature attack. In the case of cross-dataset
attach, the adversarial examples were crafted using a model
trained on dataset A, is used to attack a model trained on
dataset B.
We trained two models: model A was trained on the
YOHO dataset using MFCC features, while model B was
trained on the NTIMIT dataset using Mel-spectrum features.
Then, model B was used to create adversarial examples on
NTIMIT; these examples were used to attack model A. In
other words, models A and B were trained on two different
datasets. The examples created by model B were used to
attack model A.
We found that model A reached an accuracy of 81.55% on
NTIMIT reconstructed clean test set and 58.93% on NTIMIT
reconstructed adversarial test set, a difference of 22.62%. The
FPR was degraded from 12% to 46%.
5.4. Cross-features
A different type of back-box attack is done by creating ad-
versarial examples using one set of acoustic features and at-
tacking a model that was trained on a different set of acoustic
features. More specifically, we trained a model on the YOHO
corpus where the features were Mel-spectrum. We created
adversarial examples and reconstructed waveforms. We then
attacked a model that was trained on YOHO, but the features
were MFCC.
We found that the MFCC model reached an accuracy
of 81% on the reconstructed clean test set and accuracy of
62.25% on the reconstructed adversarial test set with a differ-
ence of 18.75%. The FPR degraded from 16% to 46%.
6. CONCLUSION
While deep neural networks have shown to improve the ac-
curacy compared to the traditional speech verification com-
ponents [28], it becomes critical to revisit the evaluation pro-
tocol of those models and design new ways to assess their
reliability beyond the traditional metrics.
For future work, we would like to evaluate the robustness
of the traditional speaker verification systems to adversarial
examples as well as to apply adversarial training techniques
to make the neural-based ones more robust to these type of
attacks.
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